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Abstract
It is widely believed among police officers that domestic incidents are among the most
dangerous incidents to which they respond. However, most research in this area suffers from the
“denominator problem,” where prior studies have focused on incidents resulting in harm to
police officers and failed to account for incidents not resulting in harm. Such methodologies can
produce drastically misleading results. This paper uses data from the 2016 National Incident
Based Reporting System (NIBRS) to overcome the denominator problem. We examine the
probability of (1) an officer being assaulted and (2) an officer being injured or killed when
responding to a domestic incident compared to a non-domestic incident while controlling for
other potentially important variables. Results indicate that officers are significantly more likely
to be assaulted or injured when responding to non-domestic incidents. Implications for law
enforcement training, victim legitimacy, and future research are discussed.
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For decades, a strongly held police axiom has claimed that domestic incidents are
inherently more dangerous to responding officers than other calls for service (e.g., Bard, 1970;
Black, 1980; Uchida et al., 1987). For instance, in 1963, the January issue of the FBI Law
Enforcement Bulletin noted that “disturbance” calls – which include domestic calls – require
officers to “exercise extreme caution, for the danger in these situations is usually from the
emotionally enraged or mentally disturbed person” (p. 26). While empirical support for such
claims is, at best, mixed (Bierie, 2017; Garner & Clemmer, 1986; Margarita, 1980a), this
longstanding belief was recently reinforced in a widely circulated report from the Department of
Justice’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) and the National Law
Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund (NLEOMF). Upon observing that between 2010 and 2014,
22% of the 91 calls for service resulting in a police officer fatality were domestic disputes, the
authors concluded that such calls are “the most dangerous type [of call] for responding officers”
(Breul & Keith, 2016, p. 15). They went on to recommend “having three or more officers at a
domestic situation to adequately separate parties, monitor family members and, if necessary,
physically restrain and arrest a suspect” (p. 16). This report was summarized as a research in
brief for Police Chief – the official publication of the International Association of Chiefs of
Police (Breul, 2017) – and reviewed on websites like PoliceOne.com (Wylie, 2016), whose
650,000+ registered member officers were told “the findings and recommendations…should be
taken to heart.” It was further covered by media outlets such as VICE News (Owen, 2016), The
Guardian (Lartey, 2016), and ABC News (Nestel, 2017), which helped disseminate the report’s
findings and recommendations to the general public.
Yet, observations such as those in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin and the
COPS/NLEOMF report are troubling for two reasons. First, there was a tendency early on to
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lump domestic and general disturbances together, when in reality, domestic disturbances are only
one form of a disturbance (Garner & Clemmer, 1986). Second, a critical limitation of their
methodologies (and much of the research on this topic) is the same “denominator problem” that
has plagued other areas of police research, including the study of racial disparities in traffic stops
(Alpert, Dunham, & Smith, 2007; Fridell, 2004; Grogger & Ridgeway, 2006; Neil & Winship,
2019; Walker, 2001) and officer-involved shootings (Cesario, Johnson, & Terrill, 2018; Fridell,
2017; Tregle, Nix, & Alpert, 2019). For example, in order to determine whether a particular
group is stopped or shot disproportionately by the police, researchers face the difficult task of
identifying the population of individuals exposed to the risk of being stopped or shot. A similar
challenge presents itself when attempting to surmise whether domestic incidents pose more of a
threat to police officers than other incidents. Focusing on the rare instances in which officers are
assaulted or injured – to the exclusion of the vast majority of instances in which officers are not
assaulted or injured – can produce drastically misleading results. In other words, the key question
that must be asked is: among all police-citizen interactions, are domestic incidents more
dangerous to officers than other types of police-citizen interactions?
The present study seeks to address this critical gap in the literature by using data from the
2016 National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) to assess whether domestic incidents
(defined as involving at least one victim and one offender who were current/former intimate
partners or family members) posed greater danger to police officers than non-domestic incidents,
in the form of (1) assaults or, more specifically, (2) assaults resulting in injury/death. This study
is the first, to our knowledge, to use national data to consider whether domestic incidents are
inherently more dangerous than other incidents, while using an appropriate benchmark (i.e., the
universe of incidents, including those not resulting in assaults or injuries). Our findings do not
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support conventional wisdom and have significant implications for training and policy. Before
turning to a discussion of our methodology and results, we shall first briefly review the extant
literature on the nature of policing domestic incidents.
Uncertainty and Danger:
Domestic Incidents from the Officer Perspective
In the late 1940s, during one of the earliest case studies of a municipal police department,
William Westley (1970, p. 61) recalled an officer saying:
You know, if there is one thing these men hate more than anything else it is to go
out on a call for a family quarrel. You ought to see their faces when they hear that
call come over the radio.
Two decades later, during field observations in Boston, Chicago, and New York City in the
1960s, Donald Black (1980) learned that one of the primary reasons officers loathed responding
to domestic disputes was the uncertainty and danger associated with them. In fact, he noted that
officers frequently drove slowly when en route to a domestic dispute—hoping the matter would
resolve itself by the time they arrived. As one officer explained, “All we get when we go in on a
family trouble is humiliated…Half the time both parties turn on us” (Black, 1980, p. 189).
Indeed, in Chicago, Parnas (1967) determined that it was not uncommon for female
complainants to attack police officers if they attempted to arrest or use coercive force against
their intimate partner.
Years later, Davis (1981, p. 11-12) observed and interviewed officers in a small police
department on the west coast and discovered that when responding to domestic disputes, the
norm was to “anticipate trouble,” as officers worried victims might “‘turn’ on them and redefine
them as the emergent villain” (see also Sinden & Stephens, 1999; Younglove et al., 2002). More
recently, in a study involving interviews with officers in Arizona, domestic calls were
characterized as full of unknowns, non-routine, and “a hot-bed of emotions” (Toon & Hart, 2005,
4

p. 21). Survey-based research yields findings consistent with these: the majority of officers
indicate they are more likely to be injured responding to domestic incidents than those involving
strangers (Gover et al., 2011; McPhedran et al., 2017).
Even inexperienced officers appear to share the belief that domestic incidents are
inherently more unpredictable and dangerous than other calls. This is likely the result of training
and socialization. Parnas (1967, p. 920) noted with regard to how Chicago police officers were
trained to handle domestic incidents, “the overall emphasis…seems to be on the danger.” Indeed,
upon asking probationary patrolmen what they learned in the academy concerning how to handle
domestic disputes, “[a]lmost all” of them recalled only that they “are often quite dangerous,” and
recollected FBI statistics suggesting as much (p. 920-21).
The evidence is clear: police officers tend to believe domestic incidents are more
unpredictable and dangerous than other calls. Such perceptions are likely to transcend time and
space as they are get passed down “through police folklore” (Konstantin, 1984, p. 32; see also
Waddington, 1999). In other words, because “police vicariously experience, learn, and re-learn
the potential for danger through ‘war stories’” shared by veteran officers (Kappeler, Sluder, &
Alpert, 1994, p. 100), officers may come to expect increased danger from domestic incidents
even without having direct experience being assaulted or injured on such calls. The lingering
question is whether such perceptions – formed directly or otherwise – reflect reality.
Measuring the Danger of Domestic Incidents
In addition to gauging officers’ perceptions of domestic incidents, researchers have
analyzed official data in an attempt to quantify the danger of domestic incidents to responding
officers. This typically involves an enumeration of assaults, injuries, and/or fatalities of officers
resulting from domestic and non-domestic incidents. For instance, as part of an evaluation of an
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NYPD family crisis intervention training program, Bard (1970) reported that assaults and
injuries experienced by officers often resulted from “the highly volatile family conflict situation”
(p. 5). Such conclusions, coupled with the early use of the terms domestic disturbances and
general disturbances interchangeably, created confusion about whether officers indeed face
greater danger when they respond to domestic incidents. Because general disturbances can
include calls for non-domestic related disputes and fights, it is inappropriate to conflate them
with domestic incidents (see discussion in Garner & Clemmer, 1986; Ellis, 1987). Once
researchers began to separate domestic incidents from general disturbances, findings suggested
that domestic incidents were in fact less likely than other disturbances and traffic incidents to
result in assaults on or injuries to officers (Garner & Clemmer, 1986). While contemporary
research has largely refrained from lumping domestic incidents together with other disturbance
calls, the evidence regarding the dangerousness of domestic incidents to officer safety remains
mixed. Some studies continue to suggest that domestic incidents are particularly dangerous to
police (e.g., Breul & Keith, 2016; Kercher et al., 2013) while others fail to support this
contention (e.g., Crifasi et al., 2016; Ellis et al., 1993; Kaminski & Sorensen, 1995; Stanford &
Mowry, 1990).
In 1994, Hirschel and colleagues stated that there are no “clear-cut, generalizable
conclusions” (p.111) regarding whether domestic incidents are inherently more dangerous to
officers. The same can be said 25 years later. However, we believe that this is primarily the result
of studies drawing conclusions about the inherent danger of domestic incidents without
consideration of the denominator (i.e., the total number of incidents to which officers respond).1
Straus, Gelles, and Steinmetz (1980, p. 232), for example, proclaimed, “As many police officers
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For exceptions, see Garner & Clemmer (1986), Ellis et al., (1993), and Stanford & Mowry (1990). Notably, these
studies are now dated and analyzed data from just a few agencies.
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are killed answering domestic disturbance calls as are killed pursuing armed robbers.” More
recently, Kercher et al. (2013) found that between 1996 and 2010, domestic incidents were the
third most common incident involving an officer fatality. Breul and Keith (2016) examined 684
officer deaths in the line of duty from 2010 to 2014 using data compiled by the National Law
Enforcement Officer Memorial Fund and found that of the 91 deaths that occurred following a
call for service, 20 (or 22 percent) were calls regarding domestic incidents.2 Examining assaults
on officers, Barrick et al. (2018) analyzed 2012 National Incident Based Reporting System
(NIBRS) data and found that 31% were the result of “responding to a disturbance.” However,
assaults resulting from disturbances were no more or less likely to result in officer injuries than
assaults resulting from initiating arrests.
In a recent study of assaults on police, Bierie (2017) employed a case-control method in
which he compared all assaults against police officers to a random sample of arrests wherein
officers were not assaulted using NIBRS data from 2002 to 2010. Though not focused
specifically on the dangerousness of domestic incidents relative to other incidents, this study
significantly advanced our knowledge on the topic because the author was able to construct a
meaningful denominator. Approximately 16% of the non-assault arrest sample involved a victim
who was a family member, compared to 15% of the assault group. Similarly, about 33% of the
non-assault arrest sample involved a victim who was a romantic partner, versus 24% of the
assault group. Based on these differences and the results of a logistic regression model predicting
the odds of an officer being assaulted, Bierie concluded “there are many other types of incidents
which were just as dangerous for police officers or even more so…domestic violence was not

2

Included in these data are state and local law enforcement officers, officers in corrections departments, federal
agencies, and other regulatory commissions that do not routinely respond to calls for service or engage in
independent enforcement or investigative activity.
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unique and extraordinary relative to other types of calls for service” (p. 919). However, two
limitations should be noted. First, victim-offender relationships were split into five dummy
variables: acquaintances, family members, romantic partners, multiple relations, and strangers.
The multiple relations group undoubtedly included incidents wherein some of the parties were
family members or romantic partners, which muddles its comparison to the reference group
(strangers). This coding scheme also precludes comparison of domestic incidents to those
involving mere acquaintances. Second, and more important, the analysis was restricted to
incidents resulting in an arrest. Yet, it is possible for officers to be assaulted during incidents that
do not involve arrests being made – a point we will revisit when we discuss the implications of
our own results.
With the exception of Bierie’s (2017) study, the bulk of the extant literature has failed to
consider the overwhelming majority of incidents (domestic or otherwise) that did not result in
officer fatalities. According to Sherman (1992), police officers in the United States respond to
millions of domestic incidents annually, making it one of the most common calls to which
officers respond. This means that there are more opportunities for officers to be assaulted or
killed responding to domestic incidents than many other types of incidents (e.g., robberies, “man
with gun” calls). Consider the following example from another field. According to the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, nearly 25,000 vehicle occupants died in traffic crashes
in 2017. The same year, approximately 5,200 motorcyclists died in traffic crashes.3 Focusing on
these numerators, as Breul and Keith (2016) do in the case of officer deaths in the line of duty,
would lead to the conclusion that automobiles are more dangerous than motorcycles. Of course,
such a conclusion would be ludicrous. Automobiles far outnumber motorcycles on the road, and
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See https://www-fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/Main/index.aspx.
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as such, are bound to outnumber motorcycles in traffic crashes. The critical question is whether
automobiles are more likely than motorcycles to be involved in traffic crashes, given each
vehicle’s representation on the roads. The same logic applies to the study of assaults and
fatalities among police officers. The question that must be asked is: are domestic incidents more
dangerous to responding officers than non-domestic incidents, considering the frequency with
which officers respond to each?
The Current Study
Taken together, it is clear that officers perceive domestic incidents to be particularly
dangerous, and it is likely that their perceptions impact their actions when responding to these
calls (e.g., DeJong et al., 2008; Hirschel & Dawson, 2011; Johnson, 2004; Logan et al., 2006). It
is also clear that domestic incidents can indeed pose danger to officers, just as any other type of
police-citizen interaction. To be sure, police-citizen interactions are unpredictable, and any type
of interaction could ultimately result in injuries or fatalities to both officers and citizens.
However, the key question is whether domestic calls are inherently more dangerous to
responding officers than other types of police-citizen interactions. Much of the research
concerned with the dangerousness of domestic incidents has suffered from the fundamental
problem of attempting to “work backward” – summing injuries or deaths, categorizing them by
call type, and concluding that because a large share of injuries and/or deaths result from domestic
incidents, that domestic incidents are particularly dangerous. Such a methodology is problematic
because it ignores the overwhelming majority of incidents – domestic and otherwise – that do not
result in officer injury or death. Ultimately, we need to understand the relationship between
domestic-related incidents and officer assaults, injuries, and/or deaths in the context of all
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incidents. This is the only way to assess accurately whether domestic incidents are inherently
more dangerous than other incidents.
Data and Methods
The current study uses data from the 2016 NIBRS to examine the relationship between
domestic incidents and (1) officer assaults and (2) officer injuries, while controlling for other
incident and agency characteristics. Launched by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in
1989 to improve the quality of national crime data, NIBRS collects incident-level data
concerning 52 offense classifications from law enforcement agencies – including detailed
information about the offense(s), offender(s), and victim(s) involved (Akiyama & Nolan, 1999;
Strom & Smith, 2017; Thompson, Saltzman & Bibel, 1999). In this way, NIBRS data provides
much more detail than the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) Summary Reporting System, which
collects limited data for ten Part I offenses, is bound by the Hierarchy Rule (i.e., only the most
serious offense committed during a single incident is reported), and does not collect information
about victim(s). Because of the analytic flexibility it offers, the FBI is discontinuing the UCR
Summary Reporting System in 2021 and completely transitioning to NIBRS – a move endorsed
by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP, 2015; Strom & Smith, 2017).4
While NIBRS offers several advantages over the UCR, it is not without limitations. Most
notable is its incomplete coverage of the United States. In 2016, roughly 37 percent of agencies
(spanning 36 states) submitted data to NIBRS, whereas nearly 91% of agencies submitted at least
partial-year data to the UCR.5 While NIBRS participation has increased significantly over time –
with the goal of full participation by 2021 – many agencies have yet to transition from the UCR.
Additional limitations of NIBRS include its overrepresentation of southern agencies and

4
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For additional information about NIBRS, see https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ucr/nibrs.
See https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016/resource-pages/cius-summary.
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underrepresentation of larger cities (Addington, 2008; Chilton & Regoeczi, 2007; McCormack et
al., 2017). Despite these limitations, the breadth of information collected by NIBRS permits us to
explore questions about the dangerousness of domestic incidents to police officers, while the
limited information collected by the UCR does not. Indeed, as Roberts (2009, p. 433) concluded
in her review of the research utilizing NIBRS:
The advantages of NIBRS over other official statistics such as the Uniform Crime
Reports, Supplementary Homicide Reports, and the National Crime Victimization
Survey have contributed to a better evaluation of a number of theoretical
perspectives in criminology and criminal justice, and have helped in suggesting
possible policy implications.
We revisit the limitations of NIBRS, and those of our study more specifically, in the
conclusion of the paper.
In 2016, more than 6.1 million criminal incidents were logged by over 6,000 agencies
representing 100 million residents from 36 states (NIBRS, 2016). In this study, we focus on the
NIBRS incidents where the victim-offender relationship is known (n=1,051,927). NIBRS data
are archived by the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data and available through the InterUniversity Consortium on Political and Social Science Research. Available variables include
offense type, the victim-offender relationship, incident time and location, weapon use, and victim
injury, among others. This makes the data useful for understanding how crime event variables
(e.g., incident type) are related to case outcomes (e.g., officer injury). Some recent studies have
also used NIBRS data to explore assaults and injuries to officers (e.g., Barrick et al., 2018; Bierie
et al., 2016; Bierie, 2017). Bierie et al. (2016), for example, compared 860 incidents involving
firearm violence directed at police officers to a random sample of 3,000 arrests not involving
firearm violence. Unfortunately, data limitations precluded the authors from classifying incidents
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as domestic or non-domestic, making it impossible to surmise whether domestic incidents were
more likely to involve firearm violence directed at police.
Independent Variable
For each of 1,051,927 incidents with a documented victim-offender relationship, NIBRS
indicated the nature of this relationship for up to 10 victims and 3 offenders. For example, the
victim and offender might be family members (e.g., spouses, siblings), acquaintances (e.g.,
friends, neighbors, co-workers), or strangers. We created a dichotomous variable – domestic
incident – that indicated whether at least one victim and offender were either current/former
intimate partners or relatives (1 = yes, 0 = no).6 Roughly 53% of these incidents with information
on victim-offender relationship were classified as domestic incidents (n = 558,124). Table 1
provides descriptive statistics for this and all other variables used in the analyses.
[Table 1 about here]
Dependent Variables
We utilized information from several fields in NIBRS to create the outcome measures.
First, NIBRS identifies the “type” of up to three victims involved in each incident (i.e.,
individual, business, financial institution, government, law enforcement officer, religious
organization, society/public, and other). Second, NIBRS includes the offense committed against
up to 10 victims by as many as 3 offenders each. Finally, NIBRS specifies the injuries sustained
by up to five victims – ranging from no injury to unconsciousness. We used this information to
create two dichotomous variables: officer(s) assaulted and officer(s) injured or killed.

6

In a sensitivity analysis, we restricted the sample to incidents involving murder/nonnegligent manslaughter,
kidnapping/abduction, rape, sodomy, sexual assault with an object, robbery, aggravated assault, simple assault, or
intimidation. The results were consistent with our primary, more inclusive models (see Appendix, Table A1).
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Officer(s) assaulted was coded 1 if one or more of the victims was a police officer and
the offense committed was any of the following: murder/nonnegligent manslaughter, negligent
manslaughter, kidnapping/abduction, rape, sodomy, sexual assault with an object, robbery,
aggravated assault, or simple assault.7 Otherwise, this variable was coded 0. Approximately
1.1% of all incidents with information about victim-offender relationship involved an assault on
a police officer (n = 11,685).
Officer(s) injured or killed was coded 1 if one or more of the victims was a police officer
and sustained any injury, including: apparent minor injury, apparent broken bones, other major
injury, possible internal injury, loss of teeth, severe laceration, or unconsciousness. Otherwise,
this variable was coded 0 – with one exception. While creating this variable, we noticed that 25
police officers were listed as victims of murder/nonnegligent manslaughter but the injury fields
for these officers were missing. We coded these incidents 1 so that our outcome reflected both
nonfatal and fatal injuries to police officers. Less than 1% of all incidents with information about
victim-offender relationship involved a nonfatal or fatal injury to a police officer (n = 4,827).
Controls
In our multivariate analyses, we controlled for several additional factors which may be
related to whether officers were assaulted or injured. Bierie et al. (2016) found that incidents
involving violent offenses and those involving weapons were associated with a significantly
greater risk of firearm violence directed at officers. Similarly, studies suggest a positive
correlation between an area’s violent crime rate and violence against police (Fridell & Pate,
1995; Fridell et al., 2009; Kaminski et al., 2003). Violent offense committed was coded 1 if the

7

A reviewer pointed out that cursing or spitting at an officer can result in a simple assault charge. In a sensitivity
analysis, we recoded our first dependent variable so that simple assaults were in the “0” category. Results were
substantively similar (see Appendix, Table A2).
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UCR offense listed for any of up to three offenders was a violent crime (0 otherwise). Weapon(s)
involved was coded 1 if any of the following weapons were involved in the incident: firearms,
knives/cutting instruments, blunt objects, motor vehicles, poison, explosives, or fire/incendiary
devices (0 otherwise). We also controlled for whether the officer(s) suspected the offender(s) of
using alcohol or drugs/narcotics shortly before or during the incident (1 = drugs/alcohol
suspected, 0 = otherwise), as both alcohol and drug use may increase the likelihood of officers
being assaulted (Bierie, 2017; Covington et al., 2014).
Incident location may also be associated with assaults and/or injuries to officers. For
example, Bierie et al. (2016) found that relative to incidents that occurred inside “buildings”
(e.g., schools, diners, gas stations, offices), those that occurred outdoors, inside residences, on
roads/highways/alleys, or in parking lots involved significantly greater risk of firearm violence.
NIBRS includes 46 location types. Similar to Tillyer et al.’s (2011) study of victim injuries using
NIBRS, we collapsed these 46 locations into two categories: semi-public/public or private. Semipublic locations are accessible to the public and typically have a place manager of some sort
(e.g., bars, convenience stores, hotels). Public locations are open to the public and although they
do not usually have a clear place manager, other individuals may be present (e.g.,
highways/roads/alleys, parking lots/garages). The increased likelihood of place managers or
other potential witnesses being present in semi-public/public locations may influence the
likelihood of offenders resisting or assaulting officers (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1995;
Cohen & Felson, 1979). Private setting was coded “1” if any portion of the incident occurred
inside of a residence or home and “0” if it strictly occurred in semi-public/public settings.
We controlled for time of day with a dummy variable (1 = evening/night [6PM to 5:59
AM], 0 = daytime [6AM to 5:59 PM]), as incidents occurring in the evening or night may pose a
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greater threat to officers due to decreased visibility or increased likelihood of individuals being
intoxicated. We also controlled for the number of victims and offenders involved with two
categorical variables. Number of victims originally ranged from 0 to 147. Following Bierie
(2017, p. 904), we truncated this variable at 5 to avoid bias resulting from high leverage, as less
than 0.15% of all incidents involved more than 5 victims. Similarly, number of offenders
originally ranged from 0 to 83, but we truncated it at 5 (less than 0.05% of all incidents involved
more than 5 offenders). Prior research suggests police officers are more likely to be assaulted
and/or injured by males (Bierie et al., 2016; Covington et al., 2004; Hirschel et al., 1994), so we
controlled for the sex of the offender(s) with a dummy variable (1 = one or more male offenders
involved, 0 = no male offenders involved). We also controlled for mean offender age and
whether there were any juvenile offenders involved (1 = yes, 0 = no), as studies have
demonstrated a correlation between offender age and assaults of police officers (Bierie, 2017;
Bierie et al., 2016; Mustard, 2001).
Municipal agencies can differ from sheriff’s departments and other agencies in terms of
function, organizational context, training, and policies – which may affect their risk of being
assaulted or injured (Falcone & Wells, 1995; Pate & Fridell, 1993; Willits, 2014). Accordingly,
we controlled for the type of agency that reported the incident to NIBRS with two dummy
variables: sheriff’s department and other agency (includes university/college police, state police,
special agency, other state agencies, and tribal agencies). Municipal agency serves as the
reference category. Finally, we controlled for region of the United States with three dummy
variables – north central, south, and west (north east is the reference category) – as prior
research has uncovered regional variation in assaults (Wilson & Zhao, 2008) and felonious
killings of police officers (Kaminski, 2008; Kent, 2010).
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Analytic Strategy
Our analysis proceeded in three steps. First, we compared the means of our outcomes
across domestic and non-domestic incidents using paired sample t-tests. Next, we examined the
bivariate correlations among all of our study variables. Then, we estimated logistic regression
models predicting each of our binary outcomes, officer(s) assaulted and officer(s) injured or
killed. For this portion of the analysis, we first estimated baseline models, which included only
the independent variable and an intercept term, and then estimated fully saturated models with
each of our controls. We used robust standard errors clustered by agency to relax the assumption
of independence of observations, since incidents were nested within agencies. Collinearity did
not appear to be a problem in any of our models. None of the variance inflation factors exceeded
4.0 (mean VIF = 1.65) and the condition number was 19.43, well below conventional thresholds
used to indicate potential multicollinearity (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013).
Results
Table 2 displays the results of two t-tests that compared the means of our dependent
variables in domestic incidents to their means in non-domestic incidents. Across both incident
types, it should be noted that assaults on officers are the exception rather than the rule. Roughly
99% of all incidents examined here did not involve an officer being assaulted. Yet, whereas
2.11% of non-domestic incidents resulted in one or more officers being assaulted, just 0.23% of
domestic incidents did (t = 91.96, p < .0001). In other words, non-domestic incidents were over
nine times more likely to involve an assault on an officer than domestic incidents. Similarly,
although only 0.81% of non-domestic incidents resulted in one or more officers being injured,
this was more than five times the officer injury rate than when responding to domestic incidents
(0.15%; t = 50.33, p < .0001).
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[Table 2 about here]
These simple analyses demonstrate how critical it is to remember the benchmark. By
considering assaults and injuries to officers relative to the universe of incidents that did not result
in assaults and injuries, we can see clearly that domestic incidents were not more dangerous to
officers than non-domestic incidents. Still, the relationships are worth exploring further. Would
these differences remain so pronounced upon controlling for the potential confounding effects of
other factors? Table 3 displays a correlation matrix that includes all of our study variables. The
correlation between domestic incident and officer(s) assaulted was negative and statistically
significant (Pearson’s rho [ρ] = -.49, p < .0001), as was the correlation between domestic
incident and officer(s) injured/killed (ρ = -.38, p < .0001). Furthermore, domestic incidents were
negatively correlated with the commission of violent offenses (ρ = -.26, p < .0001), which itself
was positively correlated with assaults (ρ = .05, p < .0001) and injuries (ρ = .10, p < .0001).
Domestic incidents were also negatively correlated with presence of weapon(s) (ρ = -.28, p <
.0001), which itself was positively correlated with assaults on officers (ρ = .03, p < .0001) but
not injuries (ρ = -.01, p < .05). However, domestic incidents were positively correlated with
suspected drug/alcohol use (ρ = .12, p < .0001), which was positively correlated with both
assaults (ρ = .25, p < .0001) and injuries (ρ = .23, p < .0001). Unsurprisingly, domestic incidents
were more likely to occur in private settings (ρ = .63, p < .0001). Both assaults (ρ = -.34, p <
.0001) and injuries (ρ = -.28, p < .0001) to officers were less likely to occur during incidents that
took place in private settings. To this point, our analyses suggest conventional wisdom runs
counter to the available data: domestic incidents appear to present less danger to officers than
non-domestic incidents using the measures of danger examined here.
[Table 3 about here]
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The last step of our analysis involved a series of logistic regression models predicting our
outcomes. The results are presented in Table 4. In Model 2, we found that upon controlling for
several other characteristics of the incidents and the parties involved, the odds of a domestic
incident resulting in an officer being assaulted were roughly 89% less likely than the odds of a
non-domestic incident resulting in an officer being assaulted (odds ratio [OR] = .107, p < .0001).
As a whole, Model 2 better predicts assaults on officers than Model 1 (Pseudo R2 = .207). The
presence of one or more weapons was negatively associated with assaults on officers (OR = .530,
p < .0001), whereas suspected drug/alcohol use by the offender(s) was positively associated with
assaults on officers (OR = 3.237, p < .0001). Incidents occurring in private locations (i.e.,
residences/homes) were significantly less likely than those occurring in semi-public or public
locations to involve assaults on officers (OR = .455, p < .0001). Incidents occurring during the
evening/nighttime were significantly more likely to involve assaults on officers than those
occurring during the daytime (OR = 1.216, p < .0001). On the one hand, as the number of victims
involved increased, so too did the odds of officers being assaulted (OR = 2.300, p < .0001). On
the other hand, as the number of offenders involved increased, the odds of officers being
assaulted decreased significantly (OR = .418, p < .0001). Relative to incidents involving no male
offenders, those involving one or more male offenders were significantly less likely to involve
officers being assaulted (OR = .797, p < .0001). Mean offender age was significantly inversely
associated with assaults on officers, but the size of the effect was small (OR = .993, p < .0001).
The involvement of one or more juvenile offenders was associated with lower odds of officers
being assaulted (OR = .556, p < .0001). We also found that sheriff’s deputies (OR = 1.291, p <
.01) and officers working for other types of agencies (OR = 1.789, p < .0001) were significantly
more likely to be assaulted than municipal officers. Lastly, Model 2 indicates significant regional
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differences, with officers working in the north central, southern, and western regions of the
United States significantly less likely to have been assaulted than those in the north east.
[Table 4 about here]
In Model 4 of Table 4, we found that the odds of a domestic incident resulting in an
officer being injured or killed were approximately 81% less likely than the odds of a nondomestic incident resulting in an officer injury or death (OR = .189, p < .0001). Again, the
Pseudo R2 improved from Model 3 (.044) to Model 4 (.171), suggesting the addition of our
control variables increases model fit. All of the other coefficients run in the same direction as in
Model 2, although one difference should be noted with respect to statistical significance.
Incidents involving one or more violent crimes were significantly more likely to result in officer
injuries/fatalities than non-violent incidents (OR = 1.553, p < .0001). Recall that violent
incidents were not significantly more likely to result in assaults on officers than nonviolent
incidents (see Model 2). With these findings in mind, we now turn to a discussion of their
practical implications and directions for future research.
Discussion
The controversy over the dangerousness of domestic incidents to officers has been
ongoing for decades. It is especially significant considering officers across the country respond
to hundreds of thousands of domestic-related incidents each year (NIBRS, 2016), if not more
(Sherman, 1992). Extant research has highlighted that officers often hold perceptions about risk
of harm in responding to these incidents; it is logical to assume that such perceptions have
implications for officer responses to these incidents (MacDonald et al., 2003; see also
Richardson et al., 2019). This study considered the dangerousness of domestic-related incidents
to officers by examining assaults and injuries to officers in light of all incidents to which police
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respond. Considering the universe of incidents to which officers respond – as opposed to only
focusing on those resulting in an assault or an injury to police officers – better addresses the
question about the dangerousness of domestic incidents to police. We highlight our main
findings below.
First, our findings underscore the rarity of assaults and injuries to police officers. These
outcomes are fortunately the exception rather than the rule when officers respond to incidents.
According to NIBRS data, only 1% of incidents wherein the victim-offender relationship was
documented (domestic or otherwise) involved an officer being assaulted. Only about half of all
assaults resulted in an injury to an officer, most of which were minor. Considering that officers
respond to millions of incidents per year, these numbers emphasize the rarity of officer injury.
Second, we found that in 2016, domestic calls were not more dangerous than nondomestic calls for service. When comparing assaults and injuries to officers in domestic-related
incidents to non-domestic incidents, we found that officers were less likely to be assaulted or
injured in domestic incidents. Not controlling for other confounders, non-domestic incidents
were nine times more likely to involve an assault on an officer, and five times more likely to
involve officer injury. Furthermore, when controlling for other factors that may be related to the
odds of an officer being assaulted or injured, we found that domestic incidents were associated
with a lower risk of harm to police. In fact, officers were 89% more likely to be assaulted in nondomestic incidents and 81% more likely to be injured or killed when responding to a nondomestic incident than when responding to a domestic incident.
Third, the results of this study underscore the importance of selecting an appropriate
benchmark to make sense of observed outcomes of interest, like assaults and/or injuries to
officers. The findings support recent research suggesting that the danger of domestic-related
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incidents to officers is not as great as previously believed (see, e.g., Bierie, 2017). We maintain
that comparing what happens to officers during domestic incidents to what happens to them in
all incidents is the most appropriate way to gauge the inherent dangerousness of domestic
incidents. Only focusing on those incidents in which officers are assaulted, injured, or killed
excludes the majority of officer-citizen interactions – those in which the officer(s) are not
assaulted, injured, or killed. When comparing against the entire population of incidents, our
results suggest domestic incidents are not the most dangerous incidents to which police respond.
Understanding the objective danger that domestic-related incidents pose to officers is
critical, as it can help inform officer perceptions about this call type and policies for responding.
Current perceptions regarding the danger of domestic incidents surely impacts officer behavior
when responding to those incidents. For example, if officers perceive domestic incidents as
especially dangerous, they may be more on edge or aggressive when they arrive on scene
(Stanford & Mowry, 1990). Alternatively, they might approach these incidents with more
caution or care (MacDonald et al., 2003; Uchida et al., 1987). Additional precaution taken by
officers might explain why both of our outcomes were negatively associated with weapons and
the presence of male offenders. In either case, officer perceptions surely affect the dynamics of
police-citizen interactions and perhaps even the victim’s future safety. For instance, research has
demonstrated that among victims of domestic violence, victim dissatisfaction with law
enforcement response to calls for service is related to a reduced likelihood of reporting
subsequent violence to law enforcement (Buzawa & Hotaling, 2006). If officers understood the
realities of these calls, how might their responses change? Officer behavior is vital in securing
victim trust and cooperation (Murphy & Barkworth, 2014; Wolfe et al., 2016). It is possible that
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perceiving these domestic situations as less dangerous – as the data suggests – could be a first
step in improving these police-citizen interactions.
Given that our study challenges conventional wisdom, agencies and training academies
might consider awareness campaigns or similar interventions to destigmatize domestic incidents.
These could involve presenting officers with more accurate statistics about the likelihood of
being assaulted or injured on a domestic call. Interventions aimed at reducing the stigma of other
aspects of police work have shown promise. For example, in Sweden, police cadets who
participated in an intervention meant to reduce the stigma associated with mentally ill persons
(i.e., a series of lectures and videos) displayed increased open mindedness and willingness to
work with them, with effects persisting at the six-month follow-up (Hansson & Markström,
2014). Similar findings have been observed in the United States among officers who participated
crisis intervention team training (Compton et al., 2006; Wells & Schafer, 2006). The effects of
such training programs may increase victim satisfaction, as well. In El Monte, California,
officers who had undergone 56 hours of crisis intervention training were rated more favorably by
citizens, who described them during follow-up phone interviews as less pushy, more reassuring,
and more competent than officers who were not trained (Pearce & Snortum, 1983, p. 86).
Whatever form a similar intervention aimed specifically at reducing the stigma of domestic
incidents takes, the challenge will be to strike an appropriate balance. Officers should be
prepared for the reality that they could be assaulted at any time when interacting with people, but
they should understand that it is exceedingly rare, and not more prone to occur during domestic
incidents. Of course, it will be vital to evaluate the effects of such training.
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Limitations and Directions for Future Research
In a recent report by the COPS Office and NLEOMF, Breul and Keith (2016) suggest
“the necessity of having three or more officers at a domestic situation to adequately separate
parties, monitor family members and, if necessary, physically restrain and arrest a suspect, is
apparent” (p.16). The results presented here suggest that such an expenditure of finite resources
may be ill-advised. However, in light of data limitations, we cannot rule out the possibility that
such precautionary tactics are common and partially responsible for domestic incidents having
the lower assault and injury rates we observed. Data that permit researchers to replicate our
models with different samples and additionally code for how incidents were dispatched (e.g.,
whether officers were told the involved parties were intimate partners or family members) would
be valuable in this regard. Similarly, future work should attempt to control for whether officers
responded to incidents alone or with backup. Currently in NIBRS, this is only possible when
incidents resulted in an officer being assaulted (less than 1% of all incidents).
Although we controlled for multiple covariates associated with incident danger in the
current study (e.g., weapons, drug/alcohol use, violence, offender characteristics), information
about other relevant factors such as officer training, experience, or officers’ use of technology
such as body armor were not available for analysis. Further, incident characteristics such as
offender and/or victim behavior toward responding officers remain “unknowns.” Including such
variables in future studies would enhance our understanding of the dangerousness of domestic
incidents to police officers. Additionally, our analyses did not examine officer risk within
domestic incident type. It is possible that certain types of domestic offenders are inherently more
dangerous to officers (Bierie, 2017), but our analyses did not capture variation within the
domestic incident. Finally, we need a better understanding of why officers perceive domestic
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incidents as especially dangerous, what (if anything) they do differently upon arrival at these
incidents, and the factors associated with said beliefs and behaviors. Survey research would be
useful in these regards, and would permit theory testing and development. These are just a few
additional avenues for future research to consider.
Changes in data collection would assist in better understanding the harm officers face
when responding to different incidents. Currently, NIBRS instructs law enforcement agencies to
complete data on the officer activity type (e.g., responding to a traffic incident, responding to a
disturbance) associated with a crime incident only when an officer is assaulted or injured. A
simple change in instruction – to complete this data field for all incidents – would greatly
improve research on officer wellness in the field. Furthermore, there is currently no field in
NIBRS that indicates whether an officer was actually dispatched to an address for each incident.
Having restricted our analysis to incidents where the victim-offender relationship was
documented, we believe it is reasonable to assume the majority of the incidents we have
analyzed did in fact involve an officer physically responding to an address, but we cannot be
100% certain. One alternative would be to restrict our analyses to arrest scenarios (see e.g.,
Bierie, 2017), but this would be too limited in scope, as an officer need not arrest someone in
order to be assaulted or injured. According to NIBRS, in 2016, there were 1,605 non-arrest
incidents that involved a police officer being assaulted. This amounts to nearly 12% of all
assaults reported to NIBRS in 2016. As important, restricting the sample to arrests would ignore
thousands of incidents wherein officers were not assaulted. As we have demonstrated, these
counterfactual incidents are critical to our understanding of trends in assaults on officers –
including whether domestic incidents are inherently more dangerous than other incidents.
Moving forward, and as NIBRS coverage continues to expand, it would behoove agencies to

24

document whether recorded incidents actually involved an officer responding and interacting
with a victim, witness, and/or suspect. Otherwise, determining with certainty the universe of
incidents where officers could have been assaulted is not possible.
Conclusion
Overall, our study has provided key insight into the dangerousness of responding to
domestic incidents. The findings indicate that domestic incidents are not as dangerous as
previously thought – with officers responding to non-domestic incidents having much higher
likelihoods of both assault and injury/death than officers who respond to domestic incidents.
Further, we maintain that these results are more accurate than much of the findings from prior
research on this topic because they take into account all incidents instead of a select few. We
hope that these findings spark additional research in this area.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (N = 1,051,927 unless otherwise noted).
Variable
Domestic incident
Officer(s) assaulted
Officer(s) injured/killed
Violent offense committed
Weapon(s) involved*
Drugs/alcohol suspected
Private setting
Evening/night*
Number of victims
Number of offenders
Male offender(s) involved*
Mean offender age*
Juvenile offender(s) involved*
Municipal agency (Reference)
Sheriff’s department
Other agency
North east (Reference)
North central
South
West

Mean
.531
.011
.005
.226
.138
.130
.649
.518
1.225
1.167
.713
32.648
.112
.746
.223
.032
.087
.328
.417
.168

Std. Dev.

Range

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
.553
.496
—
13.479
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

0–1
0–1
0–1
0–1
0–1
0–1
0–1
0–1
0–5
0–5
0–1
1 – 99
0–1
0–1
0–1
0–1
0–1
0–1
0–1
0–1

* Weapon(s) involved N = 859,457; Evening/night N = 1,026,035; Male offenders involved N = 1,050,230; Mean
offender age N = 1,021,171; Juvenile offender(s) involved N = 1,023,848.
NOTE: For binary variables, the mean represents the proportion of cases that fall into the “1” category, which is
reflected by the variable’s name.
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Table 2. Officer(s) assaulted and injured/killed, domestic v. non-domestic incidents
(N = 1,051,927).
Outcome
Officer(s) assaulted
Officer(s) injured/killed

Domestic
(n = 558,124)

Non-domestic
(n = 493,803)

0.23%
0.15%

2.11%
0.81%

t – test
91.96***
50.33***

*** p < .0001
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Table 3. Correlation Matrix (N = 816,423).
Variable
Y1 Officer(s) assaulted

Y1
—

Y2

1.00

—

-.49

-.38

—

X2 Violent offense
committed
X3 Weapon(s) involved

.05

.10

-.26

—

.03

-.01

-.28

.94

—

X4 Drugs/alcohol
suspected
X5 Private setting

.25

.23

.12

.00

-.02

—

-.34

-.28

.63

-.13

-.16

.11

—

X6 Evening/night

.05

.05

.09

.04

.05

.37

.12

—

X7 Number of victims*

.11

.09

-.08

.10

.18

.05

-.06

.01

—

X8 Number of
offenders*
X9 Male offender(s)
involved
X10 Mean offender age*

-.01

-.01

-.15

.09

.10

-.02

-.10

.02

.35

—

-.01

-.01

-.02

.18

.07

.05

-.03

.03

-.10

-.22

—

-.01

-.01

.09

-.02

.00

.11

.12

.05

-.05

-.10

.04

—

X11 Juvenile offender(s)
involved
X12 Sheriff’s department

-.04

-.04

-.29

-.08

-.12

-.45

-.28

-.27

.02

.07

-.05

-.48

—

-.01

.00

.09

-.06

-.06

.05

.14

-.01

.01

-.01

.00

.04

.03

—

X13 Other agency

.16

.11

-.12

.02

-.03

-.02

-.16

-.03

.01

.01

.02

.00

.02

-1.00

—

X14 North central

-.19

-.14

-.09

.03

.01

.08

.04

.03

-.05

-.01

.03

-.02

.02

-.22

-.02

—

X15 South

.00

-.02

.10

-.06

.03

-.06

.06

-.01

.03

.05

-.05

.00

-.01

.36

.13

-1.00

—

X16 West

.07

.11

-.02

.04

-.05

.00

-.10

-.01

.10

-.03

.04

.01

-.01

-.02

-.25

-1.00

-1.00

Y2 Officer(s)
injured/killed
X1 Domestic incident

X1

X2

X3

X4

X5

X6

X7*

X8*

X9

X10*

X11

X12

X13

X14

X15

X16

—

NOTE: All entries are tetrachoric correlation coefficients unless otherwise noted.
* Pearson’s correlation coefficients.
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Table 4. Logistic Regression Models Predicting Officer Assaults and Injuries.
DV: Officer(s) Assaulted
Model 1
Domestic incident
Violent offense committed
Weapon(s) involved
Drugs/alcohol suspected
Private setting
Evening/night
Number of victims
Number of offenders
Male offender(s) involved
Mean offender age
Juvenile offender(s) involved
Municipal agency (Ref.)
Sheriff’s department
Other agency
North east (Ref.)
North central
South
West
Intercept
Wald χ
Pseudo R2
N
2

DV: Officer(s) Injured/Killed

Model 2

OR

SE

.107***
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
.022***

.005

.001

1,930.918***
.073
1,051,927

OR
.105***
1.010
.530***
3.237***
.455***
1.216***
2.300***
.418***
.797***
.993***
.556***
—
1.291*
1.789**
—
.232***
.502***
.511***
.080***

Model 3

Model 4

SE

OR

SE

.005
.070
.030
.145
.015
.037
.038
.016
.022
.001
.029

.180***
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
.008***

.010

.116
.268
.034
.068
.065
.009

13,255.511***
.207
816,423

.000

898.413***
.044
1,051,927

OR
.189***
1.553***
.302***
2.962***
.496***
1.158**
2.468***
.452***
.796***
.989***
.550***
—
1.266*
1.429*
—
.365***
.615**
.773+
.020***

SE
.011
.109
.021
.150
.022
.044
.042
.023
.028
.001
.039
.112
.183
.055
.085
.102
.003

9,993.368***
.171
816,423

Note: Entries are odds ratios and robust standard errors clustered by agency.
+
p < .05, * p < .01, ** p < .001, *** p < .0001
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Appendix A: Sensitivity Analyses
Table A1. Sensitivity Analysis: Sample restricted to incidents involving violent offenses, simple assaults, or intimidation.
DV: Officer(s) Assaulted
Model 1
Domestic incident
Violent offense committed
Weapon(s) involved
Drugs/alcohol suspected
Private setting
Evening/night
Number of victims
Number of offenders
Male offender(s) involved
Mean offender age
Juvenile offender(s) involved
Municipal agency (Ref.)
Sheriff’s department
Other agency
North east (Ref.)
North central
South
West
Intercept
Wald χ
Pseudo R2
N
2

DV: Officer(s) Injured/Killed

Model 2

OR

SE

.106***
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
.022

.005

.001***

1,933.872***
.074
1,018,857

OR
.102***
.956
.534***
3.199***
.463***
1.202***
2.297***
.413***
.831***
.993***
.576***
—
1.296*
1.828***
—
.235***
.502***
.519***
.081***

Model 3

Model 4

SE

OR

SE

.005
.066
.030
.144
.015
.036
.038
.016
.023
.001
.030

.178***
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
.008***

.010

.117
.273
.034
.068
.066
.010

12,765.521***
.209
791,798

.001

904.193***
.045
1,018,857

OR
.185***
1.478***
.303***
2.925***
.504***
1.145***
2.467***
.448***
.825***
.989***
.570***
—
1.270*
1.453*
—
.369***
.616**
.785
.020***

SE
.010
.104
.021
.148
.023
.044
.042
.023
.029
.001
.040
.113
.187
.056
.085
.103
.003

9,689.634***
.171
791,798

Note: Entries are odds ratios and robust standard errors clustered by agency.
* p < .01, ** p < .001, *** p < .0001
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Table A2. Sensitivity analysis: Dependent variable “Officer(s) assaulted” recoded so that simple assaults = 0.
DV: Officer(s) Assaulted (excluding simple assaults)
Model 1
Domestic incident
Violent offense committed a
Weapon(s) involved
Drugs/alcohol suspected
Private setting
Evening/night
Number of victims
Number of offenders
Male offender(s) involved
Mean offender age
Juvenile offender(s) involved
Municipal agency (Ref.)
Sheriff’s department
Other agency
North east (Ref.)
North central
South
West
Intercept
Wald χ
Pseudo R2
N
2

Model 2

OR

SE

OR

SE

.136***
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
.006***

.009

.177***
—
3.001***
2.580***
.489***
1.083
2.110***
.507***
.847***
.997+
.493***
—
1.667***
1.793***
—
.317***
.539***
.954
.009***

.012

.000
859.527***
.052
1,051,927

.180
.145
.025
.045
.037
.025
.038
.002
.043
.177
.276
.046
.078
.135
.001
9,582.135***
.190
816,423

Note: Entries are odds ratios and robust standard errors clustered by agency.
+
p < .05, * p < .01, ** p < .001, *** p < .0001
a
Upon recoding the DV by putting simple assaults in the “0” category, there were only 8 incidents involving an assault on an officer in the “0” category of
violent offense committed, making the coefficient for this variable unstable. As such, we omitted it for the purposes of this sensitivity analysis.
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